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LEGAL AND ETHICAL PRECEPTS GOVERNING EMERGING MILITARY 
TECHNOLOGIES: RESEARCH AND USE 
 
George R. Lucas, Jr.* 
 
From the emergence and increasing use of unmanned or remotely piloted 
vehicles to the advent of cyber war and conflict, the development of new and 
exotic military technologies has provoked fierce and divisive public debate 
regarding the ethical challenges posed by such technologies.1 I have increasingly 
come to believe that the language of morality and ethics has served us poorly in 
this context and presently serves to further confuse us, rather than to clarify or 
enlighten us, on how best to cope with the continuing development and 
deployment of seemingly exotic new military technologies. 
There are numerous reasons that justify this concern. Segments of the public 
involved in these discussions harbor distinctive and incompatible—and sometimes 
conceptually confused and unclear—notions of what “ethics” entail. From 
individual and culturally determined intuitions regarding morally right conduct, 
through the achievement of beneficial outcomes, all the way to equating ethics to 
mere legal compliance, this discord results in frequent and virtually hopeless 
equivocation. Moreover, many scientists and engineers (not to mention military 
personnel) tend to view the wider public’s concern with ethics as misplaced and 
regard proponents of ethics as little more than technologically and scientifically 
illiterate, fear-mongering, nay-saying Luddites who simply wish to impede the 
progress of science and technology. 
Why insist on invoking fear and mistrust and posing allegedly moral 
objections to the development and use of unmanned systems, instead of defining 
clear engineering design specifications and operational outcomes that incorporate 
the main ethical concerns? Why not require engineers and the military to design, 
build, and operate to these standards if they are able, and otherwise to desist until 
they succeed? Why engage in a science-fiction debate over the future prospects for 
artificial-machine intelligence that would incorporate analogues of human moral 
cognition when what is required is far more feasible and less exotic: machines that 
function reliably, safely, and fully in conformance with applicable international 
* © 2013 George R. Lucas Jr., Professor of Philosophy & Public Policy, Global 
Public Policy Academic Group, Naval Postgraduate School; Distinguished Chair in Ethics, 
Stockdale Center, U.S. Naval Academy. A similar version of this Article is being published 
by the Amsterdam Law Forum. 
1 See, e.g., ARMIN KRISHNAN, KILLER ROBOTS: LEGALITY AND ETHICALITY OF 
AUTONOMOUS WEAPONS 117–44 (2009); P.W. SINGER, WIRED FOR WAR 382–412 (2009); 
George R. Lucas, Jr., Postmodern War, 9 J. MIL. ETHICS 289, 289–98 (2010); George R. 
Lucas, Jr., “This Is Not Your Father’s War”—Confronting the Moral Challenges of 
“Unconventional” War, 3 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 329 (2009). 
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laws—such as the law of armed conflict (LOAC)—when operating in wartime?2 
And why insist that the advent of cyber conflict is a “game changer” that ushers in 
a new mode of unrestricted warfare in which all the known laws and moral 
principles of armed conflict are rendered obsolete,3 when what is required by this 
development is merely the application of appropriate analogical reasoning to 
determine how the known constraints extrapolate to these novel conditions?4 
In this Essay, I propose the initial outlines of a framework for identifying and 
fostering productive debate over the acceptable ethical boundaries regarding novel 
technologies. First, I survey the state of discourse surrounding the ethics of 
autonomous weapon systems and cyber warfare. Next, I discuss how attempting to 
codify the emerging consensus on ethical boundaries for a given technology can 
focus the conversation on unsettled areas more effectively than vague moral 
discourse. Finally, I offer a set of precepts for the development and operation of 
autonomous systems and invite discussion on their accuracy and degree of 
comprehensiveness. I suggest how this methodology, and many of these precepts, 
applies to the regulation and governance of other military technologies as well. 
 
I.  ETHICAL DEBATE OVER NOVEL TECHNOLOGIES 
 
Three recent and prominent threads of discussion serve to illustrate the ethical 
debate over the use and development of novel technologies: first, the Arkin-
Sharkey debate over the proposed benefits and liabilities of “machine morality” as 
part of the larger, seemingly relentless drive toward developing ever-greater 
degrees of autonomy in lethally armed unmanned systems;5 second, the efforts on 
the part of members of the International Committee on Robot Arms Control 
(ICRAC)—led by Peter Asaro, Robert Sparrow, and Noel Sharkey—to outlaw the 
future development of autonomous lethally armed unmanned systems under 
international law;6 and third, the identification of areas of emerging consensus or 
agreement among the contending stakeholders regarding the role of ethics in cyber 
warfare. This third debate centers on the development of cyber weapons and 
tactics, both those aimed indiscriminately at civilian personnel and “objects” such 
as vital civil infrastructure, and highly discriminate cyber weapons like Stuxnet 
2 See George R. Lucas, Jr., Engineering, Ethics, & Industry: The Moral Challenges of 
Lethal Autonomy, in KILLING BY REMOTE CONTROL: THE ETHICS OF AN UNMANNED 
MILITARY 211, 217–21 (Bradley Jay Strawser ed., 2013). 
3 See Randall Dipert, The Ethics of Cyber Warfare, 9 J. MIL. ETHICS 384, 394–95 
(2010). 
4 See George R. Lucas, Jr., Jus in Silico: Moral Restrictions on the Use of 
Cyberwarfare, in THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF ETHICS AND WAR: JUST WAR THEORY IN 
THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 367, 368–71 (Fritz Allhoff et al. eds., 2013). 
5 See Ronald C. Arkin, The Case for Ethical Autonomy in Unmanned Systems, 9 J. 
MIL. ETHICS 332, 332–34 (2010); Noel Sharkey, Saying ‘No!’ to Lethal Autonomous 
Targeting, 9 J. MIL. ETHICS 369, 376–81 (2010). 
6 See Who We Are, INT’L COMMITTEE FOR ROBOT ARMS CONTROL, http:// 
icrac.net/who/ (last visited Oct. 13, 2013). 
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and Flame that may be used in a preemptive or preventive fashion against 
perceived threats that have resulted in no actual harm, as yet, inflicted by the 
recipient of the cyber attack.7 
These three examples do not exhaust all of the features of the wider debate 
over emerging military technologies, by any means. The increasing array of so-
called nonlethal weapons, for example, involves questions about the use of such 
weapons on noncombatants and the potential of such weapons to expand the rules 
of engagement for use of force, rather than lessening the destruction or loss of life 
as compared to the current regime.8 Prospects for military uses of nanotechnology 
raise specters of weapons and systems that might cause widespread and 
catastrophic collateral or environmental destruction.9 And efforts to use biological, 
neurological, and pharmaceutical techniques to enhance the capabilities of human 
combatants themselves raise a host of ethical questions. Such questions range from 
topics like informed consent for the use of these techniques, to the likely long-term 
health prospects for enhanced individuals following their military service, to the 
potentially undesirable social conflicts and transformations (i.e., “civilian 
blowback”) that such techniques might inadvertently bring about.10 For the present, 
however, I will stick to the three illustrations above because they collectively 
encompass a great deal of the public debate over military technology, and the 
lessons learned in response have a wider applicability to these other areas and 
topics as well. 
First, the prospects for machine models of moral cognition constitute a 
fascinating, but as yet futuristic and highly speculative enterprise. The goal of 
7 See DAVID E. SANGER, CONFRONT AND CONCEAL: OBAMA’S SECRET WARS AND 
SURPRISING USE OF AMERICAN POWER 188–209 (2012) (providing a retrospective account 
of the “Olympic Games” project to deploy the Stuxnet worm against Iranian nuclear 
facilities); George R. Lucas, Jr., Permissible Preventive Cyber Warfare, in THE ETHICS OF 
INFORMATION WARFARE (Luciano Floridi & Mariarosaria Taddeo eds., forthcoming 2013) 
(giving a preliminary summary of the discovery and strategic implications of the Stuxnet 
worm against the backdrop of three prior conflicts in Estonia, Syria, and Georgia in 2007 
and 2008). 
8 See, e.g., Paula Kaurin, With Fear and Trembling: An Ethical Framework for 
Nonlethal Weapons, 9 J. MIL. ETHICS 100, 100–02 (2010). 
9 See, e.g., James J. Hughes, Global Technology Regulation and Potentially 
Apocalyptic Technological Threats, in NANOETHICS: THE ETHICAL AND SOCIAL 
IMPLICATIONS OF NANOTECHNOLOGY 201, 201–04 (Fritz Allhoff et al. eds., 2007) 
(discussing the environmental threat of “grey goo” or unrestrained self-replicating 
nanotechnologies); Ray Kurzweil, On the National Agenda: U.S. Congressional Testimony 
on the Societal Implications of Nanotechnology, in NANOETHICS: THE ETHICAL AND 
SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF NANOTECHNOLOGY, supra, at 40, 44–47 (providing examples of 
true nanotechnology such as the military’s development of “smart dust,” which consists of 
millions of nanodevices dropped on enemy territory to provide detailed surveillance). 
10 See PATRICK LIN ET AL., ENHANCED WARFIGHTERS: RISK, ETHICS AND POLICY 11–
27, 66–76 (2013), available at http://ethics.calpoly.edu/Greenwall_report.pdf (providing an 
account of enhancement technologies and their prospective military uses and potential 
abuses). 
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developing working computational models of reasoning, including moral 
reasoning, is hardly impossible, but the effort required will be formidable.11 
“Morality” and moral deliberation remain firmly in the domain of human 
experience for the foreseeable future. In any event, discussions of ethics and 
morality pertaining to unmanned systems at present are largely irrelevant. We 
neither want nor need our unmanned systems to be ethical, let alone more ethical 
or more humane than human agents. We merely need them to be safe and reliable, 
to fulfill their programmable purposes without error or accident, and to have that 
programming designed to conform to relevant international law (such as the 
LOAC) and specific rules of engagement (ROEs). With regard to legal 
compliance, machines should be able to pass what is defined below as the modified 
“Arkin test”: autonomous unmanned systems must be demonstrably capable of 
meeting or exceeding behavioral benchmarks set by human agents performing 
similar tasks under similar circumstances.12 
Second, proposals at this juncture to outlaw research, development, design, 
and manufacturing of autonomous weapons systems seem at once premature, ill 
timed, and ill informed—classic examples of poor governance. Such proposals do 
not reflect the concerns of the majority of stakeholders who would be affected; 
they misstate, and would attempt to overregulate relevant behaviors.13 Ultimately, 
11 The degree of futuristic speculation involved in such efforts is indicated in the 
Arkin-Sharkey debate. See Arkin, supra note 5; Sharkey, supra note 5; see also RONALD 
ARKIN, GOVERNING LETHAL BEHAVIOR IN AUTONOMOUS ROBOTS 93–113 (2009) (giving a 
proponent’s account of the formidable challenges entailed in such efforts); Ronald Craig 
Arkin et al., Moral Decision Making in Autonomous Systems: Enforcement, Moral 
Emotions, Dignity, Trust, and Deception, 100 PROC. IEEE 571, 572–86 (2012) (providing 
an account of the progress on such efforts to date). 
12 This criterion—that robots comply as, or more, effectively with applicable 
constraints of LOAC on their use of force and doing of harm than human combatants under 
similar circumstances—constitutes what I have termed the “Arkin Test” for robot 
“morality” (although that is likewise somewhat misleading, as the criterion pertains 
straightforwardly to compliance with international law, not with the exhibiting of moral 
judgment). In this sense, the test for “morality” (i.e., for the limited ability to comply with 
legal restrictions on the use of force) is similar to the “Turing Test” for machine 
intelligence: we have satisfied the demand when machine behavior is indistinguishable 
from (let alone better than) human behavior in any given context. See George. R. Lucas, 
Jr., Industrial Challenges of Military Robotics, 10 J. MIL. ETHICS 274, 281 (2011); see also 
Robert Sparrow, Building a Better Warbot: Ethical Issues in the Design of Unmanned 
Systems for Military Applications, 15 SCI. & ENGINEERING ETHICS 169, 177–78 (2009) 
(explaining the need to design systems capable of complying with LOAC). 
13 In addition to proposals to outlaw armed or autonomous military robotic systems by 
ICRAC itself, a recent report from Human Rights Watch makes similar recommendations. 
See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LOSING HUMANITY: THE CASE AGAINST KILLER ROBOTS 5 
(2012), available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/arms1112ForUpload_ 
0.pdf. While unquestionably well intentioned, the report is often poorly or incompletely 
informed regarding technical details and highly misleading in many of its observations. 
Furthermore, its proposal for States to collaborate in banning the further development and 
use of such technologies would not only prove unenforceable but likely would impede 
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such regulatory statutes would prove unacceptable to, and unenforceable against, 
many of the relevant parties (especially among nations or organizations with little 
current regard for international law), and would thus serve merely to undermine 
respect for the rule of law in international relations. Machines themselves (lacking 
the requisite features of folk psychology, such as beliefs, intentions, and desires) 
by definition cannot themselves commit war crimes, nor could a machine be held 
accountable for its actions. Instead, a regulatory and criminal regime, respecting 
relative legal jurisdictions, already exists to hold accountable individuals and 
organizations that might engage in reckless or criminally negligent behavior in the 
design, manufacture, and ultimate use of unmanned systems of any sort.14 
Lastly, in contrast to robotics, which has spawned tremendous ethical debate 
but little in the way of jurisprudence, discussions of the cyber domain have been 
carried out almost entirely within the jurisdiction of international law,15 with very 
sparse comment from ethicists until quite recently.16 Some have found the threat of 
a grave “cyber Armageddon”—of the sort predicted by Clarke and Brenner17—
somewhat exaggerated. These commentators have even denied that the genuine 
equivalent of armed conflict has or could likely occur within this domain: no one 
has yet been killed, nor have objects been harmed or destroyed, in a cyber 
conflict.18 What has transpired instead is an increase in “low-intensity” conflict, 
such as crime, espionage, and sabotage, which blurs the line between such conflict 
and war and results in cumulative harm greater or more concrete than damage 
other kinds of developments in robotics (such as the use of autonomous systems during 
natural disasters and humanitarian crises) that the authors themselves would not mean to 
prohibit. It is in such senses that these sorts of proposals represent poor governance. 
14 Gary E. Marchant et al., International Governance of Autonomous Military Robots, 
12 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 272, 300–05 (2011). 
15 See MICHAEL SCHMIDT ET AL., THE TALLINN MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL 
LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER WARFARE 15–41 (2012), available at https://www.ccdcoe.org/ 
249.html; see also David E. Graham, Cyber Threats and the Law of War, 4 J. NAT’L SEC. 
L. & POL’Y 87, 98–100 (2010) (summarizing the applicability of the existing laws of war to 
cyber warfare); Michael N. Schmitt, International Law in Cyberspace: The Koh Speech 
and Tallinn Manual Juxtaposed, 54 HARVARD INT’L L.J. ONLINE 13, 15–18 (2012), http:// 
www.harvardilj.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/HILJ-Online_54_Schmitt.pdf (discussing 
the applicability of international law to cyberspace). Cyber conflict and international law is 
also a topic of a special issue of the U.S. Naval War College’s journal, International Law 
Studies. See Raul A. “Pete” Pedrozo & Daria P. Wollschlaeger, Preface to 87 INT’L L. 
STUD. xxiii, xxiv–xxvi (2011). 
16 Randall Dipert authored the first article by an ethicist to address cyber warfare. 
Dipert, supra note 3, at 394–95. Computer scientist Neil C. Rowe had earlier raised moral 
concerns about cyber weapons and strategy. See id. at 394. 
17 JOEL BRENNER, AMERICA THE VULNERABLE: INSIDE THE NEW THREAT MATRIX OF 
DIGITAL ESPIONAGE, CRIME, AND WARFARE 137–47 (2011); RICHARD A. CLARK & ROBERT 
K. KNAKE, CYBER WAR: THE NEXT THREAT TO NATIONAL SECURITY AND WHAT TO DO 
ABOUT IT 64–68 (2010). 
18 Thomas Rid, Cyber War Will Not Take Place, 35 J. STRATEGIC STUD. 5, 10–15 
(2011). 
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caused by conventional war.19 However, several recent conflicts, at least one of 
which (Stuxnet) did cross the boundary defining an act of war, 20 have suggested 
the emergence of increasingly shared norms by which such conflict can be 
assessed, and perhaps constrained. 
 
II.  CODIFICATION OF EMERGENT NORMS 
 
The final comment above illustrates an approach to understanding and 
governing the future development and use of exotic military technologies first 
suggested by Professor Gary Marchant et al.—namely, that rather than a rush 
toward proposing unenforceable treaties or ineffectual bright-line statutes of black-
letter international law, what is required is a form of governance known as soft 
law.21 Professor Marchant and his co-authors invited those engaged in the 
development and use of such technologies, in the course of their activities, to 
reflect upon and observe what appear to them to be the boundaries of acceptable 
and unacceptable conduct and to codify these boundaries by consensus and 
agreement as the principles of best practice in their fields. 
In many of the areas outlined above, emergent norms regarding ethics, legal 
jurisdiction and compliance, and perhaps most importantly, appropriate degrees of 
consent and accountability for all the stakeholders—that together constitute the 
hallmarks of good governance—have already been largely established. What is 
urgently needed at this juncture is a clear summary of the results of the discussions 
and debates (such as those surveyed above) that would, in turn, codify what we 
seem to have proposed or agreed upon in these matters, as distinguished from what 
requires still further deliberation and attention. 
In the case of the debate over autonomous systems, for example, I would 
summarize the past several years of contentious debate in the following precepts, 
which define good or best practices and address the limits of acceptable versus 
unacceptable practices. I have already undertaken this task in the realm of cyber 
conflict22 due to the reactions to several internationally acknowledged examples of 
19 John Arquilla, Cyber War is Already Upon Us, FOREIGN POL’Y, http://www.foreign 
policy.com/articles/2012/02/27/cyberwar_is_already_upon_us (last visited Mar. 5, 2013); 
Thomas Rid, Think Again: Cyberwar, FOREIGN POL’Y, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/ 
articles/2012/02/27/cyberwar (last visited Mar. 5, 2013). 
20 See SANGER, supra note 7, at 188–209; Lucas, supra note 7. 
21 Marchant et al., supra note 14, at 306–14. 
22 See Lucas, supra note 4 at 367–75. There I summarize from extant literature that 
the use of a cyber weapon against an adversary is justified whenever there is a compelling 
reason for doing so, when every reasonable effort toward resolution has been expended 
with little likelihood of success, and when further delay will only make matters even worse. 
See id. at 372–73. Resort to cyber conflict is only justified, moreover, when the weapon is 
directed purely at military targets, the attack would inflict no more damage or loss of life 
than is reasonably proportionate to the threat posed, and finally, every effort is made to 
avoid or minimize harm to noncombatant lives or property. Id. In other respects, as noted 
below, these precepts of cyber conflict are similar to, or can be straightforwardly derived 
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cyber conflict that have recently occurred, from Estonia in 2007 to 
Stuxnet/Operation Olympic Flame in 2010.23 The point of these exercises is not to 
presume or preempt proper legislative authority, but instead to focus future 
discussions upon whether such precepts are correctly stated (and if not, to modify 
them accordingly), the extent to which they are in fact widely held, and finally, to 
identify areas of omission that must still be addressed. This seems to me a far more 
constructive enterprise at this point than further futile hand-wringing over the 
ambiguities of moral discourse. 
 
III.  PRECEPTS FOR USE OF AUTONOMOUS SYSTEMS 
 
Law and moral discourse, famously, always lag behind technological 
innovations—especially, if not exclusively, in warfare—and the innovations’ 
transformative impact on the cultures in which they arise. That does not mean that 
law and morality are irrelevant and must be cast aside; neither does it require that 
ethics always be portrayed as an impediment or obstacle to technological 
development. Rather it demands, as such developments always have, that human 
agents employ appropriate ingenuity in the framing of suitable metaphors, the 
drawing of the most appropriate analogies, and reasoning by extrapolation from the 
known to the unknown in the continuing quest to order and organize the perplexing 
opportunities and risks that innovation and change otherwise invariably pose. In 
that spirit, I offer these precepts as the emerging consensus on the use of 
autonomous weapons systems. 
 
Precept #1: The Principle of Mission Legality 
 
A military mission that has been deemed legally permissible and morally 
justifiable on all other relevant grounds does not lose this status solely on the basis 
of a modification or change in the technological means used to carry it out (i.e., by 
removing the pilot from the cockpit of the airframe or replacing the pilot with 
demonstrably reliable software). However, this does not hold true if the technology 
in question represents or employs weapons or methods that are already specifically 
proscribed under existing international weapons conventions, is in violation of the 
prohibitions in international humanitarian law against means or methods that inflict 
superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering, or is otherwise judged to constitute 
means mala in se (i.e., evil in themselves).24 
from, several of the precepts regarding the development and use of unmanned systems 
discussed in this Article. 
23 See supra note 7. 
24 Wendell Wallach of Yale University, a well-respected ethicist, has recently 
proposed that lethal autonomous systems, at least, should—like rape and biological 
weapons—be classified among the means and methods of warfare that are mala in se. See 
Wendall Wallach, Terminating the Terminator: What to Do About Autonomous Weapons, 
SCI. PROGRESS (Jan. 29, 2013), http://scienceprogress.org/2013/01/terminating-the-termina
tor-what-to-do-about-autonomous-weapons. This position would render the argument 
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Precept #2: The Principle of Unnecessary Risk25 
 
Within the context of an otherwise lawful and morally justified international 
armed conflict or domestic security operation, we owe the war-fighters or domestic 
security agents every possible minimization of risk we can provide them in the 
course of carrying out their otherwise legally permissible and morally justifiable 
missions. 
 
Precept #3: The Principle of the Moral Asymmetry of Adversaries26 
 
By contrast, no such obligation is owed to opponents or adversaries during 
such missions in their pursuit of presumably illegal and morally unjustifiable 
activities. That is, there is no requirement of fairness or technological equality in 
carrying out justified international armed conflict or lawful domestic security 
operations. NATO/ISAF forces no longer owe combat parity or fairness to Taliban 
and al-Qaeda operatives than domestic immigration and border security forces owe 
such parity to armed agents of drug cartels. Both sets of adversaries are engaged in 
virtually identical behavior: violation of domestic legal statutes and defiance of 
duly elected legal authorities, indiscriminate targeting of civilians and destruction 
of property, kidnapping, torture, execution, mutilation of prisoners, and so on. 
 
Precept #4: The Principle of Greatest Proportional Compliance 
 
Furthermore, in the pursuit of a legally permissible and morally justifiable 
military or security mission, agents are obligated to use the means or methods 
regarding mission legality with respect to the use of such technology moot. It is not at all 
clear, however, that the reasons adduced for this classification are compelling in the case of 
unmanned systems generally. Not only does the analogy between autonomous systems and 
the examples of means mala in se given above not appear obvious, but Wallach’s argument 
also rests on the largely discredited objection that machines cannot be held accountable for 
their actions. 
25 Bradley Jay Strawser, Moral Predators: The Duty to Employ Uninhabited Aerial 
Vehicles, 9 J. MIL. ETHICS 342, 343–49 (2010). 
26 Note that this is not an explicit rejection of the doctrine of the “Moral Equality of 
Combatants,” an essential element in what Michael Walzer defines as “the War 
Convention.” See MICHAL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS: A MORAL ARGUMENT WITH 
HISTORICAL ILLUSTRATIONS 34–37, 44–46 (1977). Rather, it is a repudiation of a 
misplaced notion of fairness in combat, according to which it would be unfair for one side 
in a conflict to possess or use weapons or military technologies that afforded them undue 
advantage. This is sometimes cited in public as an objection to the use of drones in warfare. 
It seems to equate war with a sporting competition, after the fashion of medieval jousting, 
and upon examination, is not only patently ridiculous, but contradicted in most actual 
armed conflicts of the past where maneuvering for technological superiority was a key 
element in success. In any case, no such argument is made concerning legitimate domestic 
security operations, as noted above, and does not obtain either within the realm of wars of 
law enforcement or humanitarian intervention. 
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available that promise the closest compliance with the international LOAC and 
applicable ROEs, such as noncombatant distinction (i.e., discrimination) and the 
economy of force (i.e., proportionality). 
 
Precept #5: The Modified “Arkin Test”27 
 
In keeping with Precept 4, an artifact (such as an autonomous unmanned 
system) satisfies the requirements of international law and morality pertaining to 
armed conflict or law enforcement and may therefore be lawfully used alongside or 
substituted for human agents whenever the artifact can be shown to comply with 
the relevant laws and ROEs as (or even more) reliably and consistently as human 
agents under similar circumstances. Moreover, from application of Precepts 2 and 
4 above, the use of such an artifact is not merely legally permissible but morally 
required whenever its performance promises both reduced risk to human agents 
and enhanced compliance with LOAC and ROEs. 
 
Precept #6: The Principle of Nondelegation of Authority and Accountability28 
 
The decision to attack an enemy (whether combatants or other targets) with 
lethal force may not be delegated solely to an unmanned system in the absence of 
human oversight, nor may eventual accountability for carrying out such an attack 
be abrogated by human operators in the “kill chain.” 
 
Precept #7: The Principle of Due Care 
 
All research and development, design, and manufacturing of artifacts such as 
lethally armed or autonomous unmanned systems that are ultimately intended for 
use alongside, or in place of, human agents engaged in legally permissible and 
morally justifiable armed conflict or domestic security operations must rigorously 
comply with Precepts 1–5 above. All R&D, design, and manufacturing of 
unmanned systems undertaken with full knowledge of, and in good faith 
compliance with, the above precepts (with such good faith at minimum to 
encompass rigorous testing to ensure safe and reliable operation under the terms of 
these precepts) shall be understood as legally permissible and morally justifiable. 
 
Precept #8: The Principle of Product Liability 
 
Mistakes, errors, or malfunctions that nonetheless might reasonably and 
randomly be expected to occur, despite the full and good faith exercise of due care 
as defined in Precept 6 above, shall be accountable under applicable international 
or domestic product liability law. Such accountability shall include full and fair 
27 See Arkin, supra note 5, at 332–34. 
28 This principle is indebted to the work of philosopher Robert Asaro of the New 
School in New York City, cofounder of ICRAC. 
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financial and other compensation or restitution for wrongful injury, death, or 
destruction of property. 
 
Precept #9: The Principle of Criminal Negligence 
 
By contrast, R&D, design, or manufacturing of systems undertaken through 
culpable ignorance or in deliberate or willful disregard of these precepts (including 
failure to perform or attempts to falsify the results, tests regarding safety, reliability 
of operation, or compliance with applicable law and ROEs, especially in the 
aftermath of malfunctions as noted above) shall be subject to designation as war 
crimes under international law, or as reckless endangerment or criminally 
negligent behavior under the terms of applicable international or domestic law. 
Individual parties to such negligence shall be punished to the full extent of the law, 
to include trial and conviction in the International Criminal Court for the willful 
commission of war crimes or civil and criminal prosecution within the appropriate 
domestic jurisdiction for reckless endangerment or criminal negligence. In 
domestic jurisdictions providing for capital punishment upon conviction for the 
occurrence of such mishaps within that jurisdiction, such punishment shall be 
deemed an appropriate form of accountability under the precepts above. 
 
Precept #10: Benchmarking 
 
Testing for safety and reliability of operation under the relevant precepts 
above shall require advance determination of relevant quantitative benchmarks for 
human performance under the conditions of anticipated use and shall require any 
artifact produced or manufactured to meet or exceed these benchmarks. 
 
Precept #11: Orientation and Legal Compliance 
 
All individuals and organizations (including military services, industries, and 
research laboratories) engaged in R&D, design, manufacturing, acquisition, or use 
of unmanned systems for military purposes shall be required to attend an 
orientation and legal compliance seminar of not less than eight hours on these 
precepts, and upon its conclusion, to receive, sign, and duly file with appropriate 
authorities a copy of these precepts as a precondition of their continued work. 
Failure to comply shall render such individuals liable under the principle of 
criminal liability (Precept 9) above for any phase of their work, including but not 
limited to, accidents or malfunctions resulting in injury, death, or destruction of 
property. 
Government and military agencies involved in contracting for the design and 
acquisition of such systems shall likewise require and sponsor this orientation 
seminar and facilitate the deposit of the required signed precept form by any 
contractors or contracting organizations receiving federal financial support for 
their activities. Federal acquisitions and procurement officials shall also receive 
this training and shall be obligated to include the relevant safety/reliability 
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benchmarks of human performance along with other technical design 
specifications established in RFPs or federal contracts.29 
 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 
My intent in offering these precepts is to suggest areas of consensus and 
agreement discerned among contending stakeholders and positions in this debate, 
and to suggest the norms emerging from this debate that might serve to guide (if 
not strictly govern) the behavior of states, militaries, and those involved in the 
development, testing, and manufacture of present and future unmanned systems. I 
likewise believe that discussion of the meaning, application, and refinement of 
these precepts as soft-law guidelines for proper use of unmanned systems would be 
substantially more efficacious than further moral hand-wringing over their 
potential risks, let alone rushing to legislation that would have both unenforceable 
and unintended harmful consequences. 
Some of the foregoing precepts are specific to military robotics (e.g., Precepts 
5 & 6, pertaining to the Arkin test and prohibition on delegation of authority to 
unmanned systems, respectively). This general approach, based upon mutual 
consensus regarding emerging norms and many, if not most, of the precepts 
elicited above, however, would prove useful by analogy as well in other areas of 
technological development, such as nonlethal weapons, cyber warfare, projects for 
“warrior enhancement,” and other military or domestic security technologies. 
In the case of cyber conflict, for example, Precept 1 pertaining to mission 
legality would likewise suggest that, in any situation in which a use of force was 
otherwise deemed justifiable, that justification would extend to the use of cyber 
weapons and tactics as well as to conventional weapons and tactics. Moreover, by 
the Principle of Greatest Proportional Compliance (Precept 4 above), in an instance 
in which the use of force was otherwise justifiable, given a choice of cyber versus 
conventional weaponry, the use of the more discriminate and less destructive 
weapon (presumably the cyber weapon) would not merely be permitted, but 
obligatory. This principle also dictates the use of less-lethal (or nonlethal) 
weaponry, when the effects otherwise achieved are equivalent. 
In sum, I believe there is far more consensus among adversarial parties 
arguing about ethics and law in such matters than we have heretofore been able to 
discern. That emerging consensus, in turn, points toward a more productive regime 
of governance and regulation to ensure against the risk of unintended harm and 
consequences than do rival attempts at legal regulation or moral condemnation. 
29 A similar set of procedures (i.e., Precepts 10 and 11) is recommended for analogous 
programs involving cyber weapons and tactics, nonlethal weapons, and human 
enhancement projects (the last already to include compliance with relevant federal 
requirements regarding research on human subjects). 
                                                          
